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Dropped Calls: 
The Extent of the Free Speech Guarantee 
to Wireless Communications Service 
by 
CANDICE SHIH 
I. INTRODUCTION
As President Hosni Mubarak scrambled to hold on to control of 
Egypt in the face of tens of thousands of protesters in January 2011, 
he made a most modern decision.  “One by one, the lines of 
communication that connected Egypt to the 21st century shut down. 
Twitter, Facebook, and eventually all Internet access were cut off; 
text messaging became impossible, and then millions of mobile 
phones went silent across the country.”1  As the world knows, it was 
for naught; Mubarak’s retirement was announced on February 11, 
2011.2
Egypt has not been alone in disabling such infrastructure during 
the Middle East uprisings known as the Arab Spring that began in 
late 2010.3  As the anti-government protests spread across the region, 
Libya cut off Internet almost entirely,4
1. Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., Rage Against the Regime, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17,
2011, at 18. 
 Syria intermittently shut down 
2. David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps Down, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html. 
3. Timeline:  The Major Events Of The Arab Spring, NPR (Oct. 6, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489844/timeline-the-major-events-of-the-arab-spring 
4. David D. Kirkpatrick & Mona El-Naggar, Qaddafi’s Son Warns of Civil War as
Libyan Protests Widen, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Feb. 20, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/world/africa/21libya.html. 
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its 3G mobile network;5 and web traffic in Bahrain was reduced by 
ten  to twenty percent, with sites such as YouTube blocked.6
China imposed an even longer blackout when it terminated 
Internet and cell phone service in July 2009 in the Xinjiang region to 
stop the spread of deadly ethnic rioting.
 
7  The government, known for 
its censorship apparatus called the Great Firewall, fully restored the 
communication services ten months later after the threat of violence 
had dissipated.8
Americans cannot be confident that they are immune from such 
restrictions on modern communication.  On August 11, 2011, the Bay 
Area Rapid Transit System (BART) shut down cell phone and 
wireless service in an effort to thwart protestors, angry about a fatal 
shooting of a knife-wielding man by a BART police officer in San 
Francisco, from disrupting transit services.
 
9   The parallel 
characteristics to foreign events were immediately evident.  In all of 
these cases, the state or a state agency terminated a wireless service 
on the grounds of public safety.  Creating neologisms out of the 
familiar situation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation said, “BART 
Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco,”10 and Egyptian activists called the 
transit system’s move a “muBARTak.”11
5. Jennifer Preston, Seeking to Disrupt Protesters, Syria Cracks Down on Social
Media, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (May 22, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/world/middleeast/23facebook.html. 
  However similar these acts 
by BART were to those of Mubarak, the question to be considered in 
this Note is whether they violated the free expression guarantee of 
6. Fahmida Y. Rashid, Bahrain Restricts Internet Traffic, Blocks YouTube in
Crackdown on Protests, EWEEK (Feb. 18, 2011), http://eweek.com/c/a/Security/Bahrain-
Restricts-Internet-Traffic-Blocks-YouTube-in-Crackdown-on-Protests-386152/. 
7. Internet cut in Xinjiang to Prevent Spread of Riot’, CHINA DAILY, (July 7, 2007),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-07/07/content_8387845.htm; Edward Wong, 
After Long Ban, Western China Is Back Online, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (May 14, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/15/world/asia/15china.html. 
8. Wong, supra note 7.
9. A Letter From BART to Our Customers, Bay Area Rapid Transit, (Aug. 20,
2011), http://www.bart.gov/news/articles/2011/news20110820.aspx; Michael Cabanatuan, 
BART Admits Halting Cell Service to Stop Protests, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Aug. 
13, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/BART-admits-halting-cell-service-to-stop-
protests-2335114.php 
10. Eva Galperin, BART Pulls a Mubarak in San Francisco, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION  (Aug. 12, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/bart-pulls-mubarak-
san-francisco. 
11. Joshua Hersh, Egyptian Activists See Hypocrisy in BART Shutdown, London
Riots, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/16/bart-london-riots-egypt_n_928144.html. 
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the First Amendment 12
Reflecting concern among the public that BART exceeded its 
authority, the Federal Communications Commission (“F.C.C.”) 
began a continuing  investigation on August 15, 2011.
 and the constitutional validity of related 
possible governmental interference with wireless communications. 
13  The F.C.C. 
stated, “[a]ny intentional interruption of wireless service, no matter 
how brief or localized, raises significant concerns and implicates 
substantial legal and policy questions . . . . We are concerned that 
there has been insufficient discussion, analysis, and consideration of 
the questions raised by intentional interruptions of wireless service by 
government authorities.”14
In the meantime, BART adopted a new policy on December 2, 
2011, permitting future interruption of wireless communication only 
where “‘there is strong evidence of imminent unlawful activity’ 
threatening safety, property or service” and only in limited areas and 
during limited time periods.
 
15  In fact, “[u]nder the new policy, BART 
would not have turned off the wireless phone system under 
circumstances similar to those in August” but instead would have 
instructed police officers to arrest people who were breaking the 
law.16
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 
13. Sara Jerome, FCC Probing Wireless Blocking by San Francisco Authorities,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Aug. 15, 2011),
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2011/08/fcc-probing-wireless-blocking.php; FCC 
Chairman Julius Genachowski’s Statement on BART Policy Adoption, FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
chairman-julius-genachowskis-statement-bart-policy-adoption. 
14. Commission Seeks Comment on Certain Wireless Service Interruptions, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0301/DA-12-311A1.pdf. 
[hereinafter Commission Seeks Comment]. 
15. Michael Cabanatuan, BART Cell Phone Shutdown Rules Adopted, SAN 
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/12/01/BA1C1M74UB.DTL&tsp=1. 
16. Edward Wyatt, F.C.C. Asks for Guidance on Whether, and When, to Cut Off
Cellphone Service, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Mar. 2, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/technology/fcc-reviews-need-for-rules-to-interrupt-
wireless-service.html. Additionally, California legislators considered a bill that would 
require a magistrate order to implement an interruption in wireless service, although it 
was vetoed by the governor for putting too much pressure on law enforcement officials 
responding to an emergency.  S.B. 1160, 2011-2012 Reg. Se.. (Ca. 2012), 
http://www.leginfor.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1151-
1200/sb_1160_bill_20120831_enrolled.pdf, http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1151-
1200/sb_1160_vt_20120929.html; Don Babwin, Chicago Asked Not to Stifle Wireless at 
Summits, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9SU230O0.htm. 
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Whether BART itself faces another occasion in which to consider 
disabling its wireless infrastructure, future protests and threats to 
public safety in the United States are inevitable.  To that end, 
Congress has considered bills that would grant the President the 
ability to essentially shut down the Internet, including the Protecting 
Cyberspace as a National Asset Act17 and the Cybersecurity Act of 
2010.18
II. BACKGROUND
Whether a shutdown of cell phone and wireless services is 
local or national in scale, the government’s interests must be balanced 
with First Amendment rights.  This Note will discuss the various 
doctrines that inform when such a termination of modern 
communication systems is constitutional and when it is not. 
What First Amendment rights do we as Americans have to 
wireless Internet and phone access? Consider a brief examination of 
older forms of communication.  The Constitution itself only 
envisioned the Postal Service as a means of communication between 
distant parties.19  However, the right to send mail through the federal 
system is not absolute, as the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute 
allowing residents to remove their names from mailing lists in Rowan 
v. United States Post Office Dept.20  The sender did not have a First
Amendment right to send unwanted mail; because it was unwanted
and invaded the home, the Court likened the sender’s act to a form of
trespass that did not warrant such constitutional protection. 21
As with mail, courts have held that one’s First Amendment right 
to use a phone is not absolute.  For example, prisoners’ phone rights 
are “subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security 
Further, the Constitution does not mandate the provision of land-
based telephone lines.
17. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010, S. 3480, 111th Cong. § 249
(2nd Sess. 2010). 
18. Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. § 18 (1st Sess. 2009). However,
considering the successful protests against SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA 
(Protect Intellectual Property Act) on Jan. 18, 2012, passage of such an act would likely 
face significant civic hostility and political backlash. See Andrew Rosenthal, Behold the 
Power of Google, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://loyalopposition.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/behold-the-power-of-google/. (On the 
same day thousands of websites, most notably Wikipedia, instituted a blackout in protest 
of the bills, Congress members pulled their support for them). 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.  See generally, U.S. CONST.
20. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
21. Id. at 735-37.
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interests,” 22  and drivers in many states, including California, are 
banned from using cell phones to send text messages to avoid 
distractions.23  Both situations involve a content-neutral ban, which 
faces a lower level of judicial review.  To meet that standard of 
review, the restriction must be “narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest” and leave open ample alternative 
means of communication, as articulated in Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism.24
However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Internet receives 
full First Amendment protection in Reno v. American Civil Liberties 
Union,
  Restrictions on phone use while imprisoned or driving 
appear appropriately tailored to the safety interest that the 
government promotes.  As for the alternative means of 
communication, prisoners, who already face limited rights, may be 
permitted use of land-based phones and drivers can simply pull over 
and commence with texting. 
25 even though it is unclear when that protection is outweighed 
by other concerns that include public safety.  “(T)he Internet – as ‘the 
most participatory form of mass speech yet developed’ – is entitled to 
‘the highest protection from government intrusion.’”26  In striking 
down a federal statute that restricts the computer transmission of 
indecent material to minors on First Amendment grounds, the Court 
declined to apply the jurisprudence it has developed relating to 
broadcast media.27  Special justifications for regulating television and 
radio include the scarcity of available frequencies and the “invasive” 
nature of such media.28  But “[t]hose factors are not present in 
cyberspace,” a vast democratic forum that has not been subject to the 
government supervision and regulation long associated with the 
broadcast industry.29
A consideration of the limits of First Amendment freedoms 
regarding new media necessitates analysis under the Supreme Court’s 
established doctrines of content neutrality, public forums, 
 
22. Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir. 1986).
23. Cell Phone and Texting Laws, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASSOCIATION.,
(Sept. 2012), http://www.ghsa.org/html/stateinfo/laws/cellphone_laws.html. 
24. 491 U.S. 781, 796, 802 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) at p. 796). 
25. 521 U.S. 844, 845 (1997).
26. Id. at 863 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (Dalzell, J., supporting opinion)). 
27. Id. at 868.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 868-69.
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overbreadth, and prior restraints.30
III. ANALYSIS
  The strength of the government’s 
justification for blocking wireless communication will depend on 
which doctrine is employed.  However, under any doctrine, the 
government should find significant constitutional limitations on such 
action, and rightly so as Internet and cell phone use grows to 
dominate modern forms of communication. 
A. Content Neutrality
A threshold question for determining the government’s ability to
restrict First Amendment activity is whether the government action is 
content-based or content-neutral.31  When an action or statute is 
content-based, it is presumed to be invalid32 and the government must 
survive strict scrutiny review by demonstrating a compelling 
government interest that is addressed through the most narrowly 
tailored means.33  Narrow tailoring is achieved under strict scrutiny if 
less restrictive alternative means are not available. 34   When a 
regulation is content-neutral, the government only needs to establish 
that it has a significant interest that is narrowly tailored while leaving 
open ample alternative means of communication. 35   The narrow 
tailoring requirement is less stringent under the Ward analysis, as it is 
satisfied as long as the regulation would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.36
1. The Government’s Termination of Wireless Communication to Squelch
Protest Should be Considered Content-Based and thus Subject to Strict
Scrutiny.
 
Terminating a geographic area’s access to wireless communication
appears to be content-neutral on its face.  Although other countries 
have blocked certain sites such as Twitter and Facebook, what took 
place in San Francisco was a blockage based on a medium, not any 
particular content provider.  No one in the downtown San Francisco 
30. Another doctrine, vagueness, is not likely to be a direct concern where the
government has acted to shut down wireless access to the Internet and mobile phone 
infrastructure. 
31. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-42 (1994).
32. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
33. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
34. Id.
35. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 802.
36. Id. at 799 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
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BART stations on Aug. 11, 2011 could use their cell phones to call, 
text, or communicate with anyone.  However, BART’s purpose was 
not only content-based, but arguably viewpoint-based, which makes 
its action even less likely to be constitutional.37  The reason behind the 
interruption of cell phone communication at BART was to prevent 
protestors from gathering and disrupting service.38  BART wanted to 
prevent a particular message from being distributed among 
protestors, for example, “Come to Civic Center Station at 4:30 p.m. 
We’re going to stop service by chaining ourselves to the trains.”39
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that a statute 
that is content-neutral on its face but content-based in purpose may 
be held to a higher degree of scrutiny.  The Ward Court stated: “The 
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases 
generally . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.  The 
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”
 
With the focus on a specific message, BART’s purpose was content-
based and possibly viewpoint-based even though its action was 
facially content-neutral.  One could draw the same conclusions 
regarding the protests in Egypt and to hypothetical future protests in 
the United States; where wireless communication has been 
terminated to thwart a protest, the purpose is content-based while the 
action may be facially content-neutral. 
40 In Ward, 
the Court determined the government’s purpose was content-neutral 
as it intended to control noise levels to protect neighborhood 
character, rather than a particular type of sound or noise. 41
This argument may appear to be undercut by the Court’s holding 
in United States v. O’Brien that the government’s purpose in 
  In 
contrast, the government’s purpose in terminating wireless 
communication is to silence public demonstrations, not eliminate all 
cell phone conversations or Internet use. 
37. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000). (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.
Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)). 
38. Letter From BART, supra note 9.
39. See Cabanatuan, supra note 15.
40. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. See also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (“In
determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the 
purpose behind the regulation . . .”) and Turner, 512 U.S. at 642 (“[A] content-based 
purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content 
based . . .”). But see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) 
(rejecting a test for content neutrality based on the justification for the regulation). (citing 
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 295). 
41. Ward, 491 U.S. at 792.
   
234 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [35:1 
restricting speech does not factor into the constitutional analysis.42 
However, the Court only explicitly stated that it could not void 
legislation based on congressional purpose given the dangers of 
relying on the statements of “fewer than a handful of Congressmen.”43 
In the later case of Ward, the Court relied on the government’s 
“clearly content-neutral goals” to determine it should apply an 
intermediate level of review in evaluating the restriction.44
O’Brien is also inapt to the BART scenario because the statute at 
issue there had no “inevitable unconstitutional effect” given that the 
destruction of draft cards was not necessarily expressive.
  In fact, 
O’Brien and Ward are not inconsistent but may be applied together; 
whereas the O’Brien Court refused to look at government purpose to 
invalidate an act, the Ward Court considered the government purpose 
only in deciding which level of review to apply.  One analyzing the 
BART situation could consider the government’s purpose to be 
content-based and apply strict scrutiny review, without violating 
O’Brien’s instruction not to leap directly from government’s purpose 
to invalidation. 
45 In 
contrast, shutting off wireless communication services has an 
unconstitutional effect by abridging a significant amount of 
expressive, constitutionally protected speech.  If they had the 
technological ability on August 11, 2011, the thousands of people who 
used or rode through the downtown BART stations during the 
weekday rush hour46
Lower courts have relied on Ward, without referencing O’Brien, 
in finding that a government regulation is content-based because the 
government’s purpose was content-based.  In particular, the Third 
Circuit reviewed a case in which an anti-abortion demonstrator was 
removed from a sidewalk in front of the Liberty Bell Center in 
Philadelphia by National Park Service rangers in United States v. 
Marcavage.
 would likely have generated hundreds, if not 
thousands, of calls, text messages, and other forms of communication 
unrelated to participation in the protest.  (In fact, many would have 
likely sent a message such as this: “BART delayed.  Will be late.”) 
47
42. 391 U.S. 367, 382-83 (1968).
The court rejected an argument that removing the 
protestor was a content-neutral action because the government was 
43. Id. at 384.
44. Ward, 491 U.S. at 782-83.
45. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 385.
46. See Monthly Ridership Reports, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT,
http://www.bart.gov/about/reports/ridership.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
47. 609 F.3d 264, 269 (3d Cir. 2010).
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concerned about public safety and he was impeding traffic flow.48 
Citing Ward,49 the court looked at the evidence, including testimony 
of the government’s witnesses, 50  to determine the government’s 
purpose was in fact content-based51 and that its action must therefore 
be reviewed under strict scrutiny.52  Also relying on Ward, a District 
Court applied strict scrutiny after finding a statute that prohibits the 
influence of a judge or juror was content-based because the 
government’s purpose in enacting it was content-based53
It is the message of influence itself which is conveyed in these 
communication[s] and which the statute seeks to prevent.  The 
justification for the statute is to prevent the evil associated 
with the content of these communications.  The question of 
whether a communication to a judge or juror violates Article 
247 depends on the content of the communication.
 despite the 
application’s facial content-neutrality: 
54
Despite indications that a content-based purpose could doom a 
facially content-neutral action, the Supreme Court “almost never 
labels an action according to this determination.”55  The problem is 
that finding sufficient evidence that the purpose in question truly is 
content-based is difficult to do, thus requiring a challenger to 
successfully argue it is facially content-based in order for a court to 
apply strict scrutiny.56  Although such factual findings are rare or even 
avoided, as in Hill v. Colorado,57
48. Id. at 280.
 they were discovered in Marcavage 
49. Id. at 279.
50. Id. at 281.
51. Id. at 283.
52. Id. at 286.
53. Caribbean Int’l News Corp. v. Fuentes Agostini, 12 F. Supp. 2d 206, 217 (D.P.R.
1998). 
54. Id. Other varied court findings based on the same principle in Ward include
Farnsworth v. City of Mulvane, Kan., 660 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1225-26 (D. Kan. 2009) (where 
restricting the speech of a private citizen at a city council meeting was viewpoint-based); 
Moser v. F.C.C., 826 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Or. 1993), rev’d, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(where a finding that the statute was content-based because of the government’s purpose 
was reversed); and Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. 
Supp. 2d 670, 688 (M.D. Tenn. 1998) (rev’d on other grounds, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), 
rev’d on other grounds, 531 U.S. 288 (2001), and rev’d on other grounds, 262 F.3d 543 (6th 
Cir. 2001)) (relying on Ward to identify a content-based purpose justifying strict scrutiny). 
55. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 620 (2003). 
56. Id. at 621.
57. 530 U.S. 703. See infra notes 62-66.
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and they could be determined in the BART situation.  In fact, BART 
has made it clear that it terminated wireless service in order to 
prevent would-be protestors from communicating information about 
the protest with each other.58
The secondary effects doctrine also focuses on government 
purpose rather than on the content neutrality of the application.  In 
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., the Court determined that a 
statute that was content-based on its face was actually content-neutral 
because of its purposes.
 
59  There, a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult 
theaters from operating in a certain area was reviewed as content-
neutral and upheld because the content-neutral purpose was to 
protect the neighborhood from the secondary effects of decreased 
quality of life and property values.60
Reliance on Ward and Renton could lead one to believe that a 
government regulation that is content-neutral in application but 
content-based in purpose would be considered content-based and 
subject to strict scrutiny.  However, such a position would require 
distinguishing the cases upholding speech-free buffer zones around 
abortion clinics.
 
61  In Hill, for example, the Court determined that a 
restriction on speech within 100 feet of the entrance to an abortion 
clinic was content-neutral even though it appeared clear that the 
purpose of the buffer zone was to silence anti-abortion protests.62  But 
a majority of justices could not agree on the standards by which 
content neutrality should be decided.  The plurality opinion written 
by Justice Stevens held the statute was content-neutral because it did 
not restrict any viewpoint or subject matter;63 a concurrence by Justice 
Souter, joined by three justices, stated it was content-neutral because 
it targeted the delivery of the messages and not the content of the 
messages themselves; 64  Justice Scalia’s dissent, joined by Justice 
Thomas, argued it was content-based because it was a means of 
impeding speech against abortion as applied;65
58. Letter From BART, supra note 9.
 Justice Kennedy wrote 
59. 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
60. Id. at 44, 48.
61. See Hill, 530 U.S. 703 and Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753
(1994). 
62. Hill, 530 U.S. at 707-09, 725.
63. Id. at 719.
64. Id. at 737-38 (Souter, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 743-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a separate dissent and stated that it was content-based because it 
restricted speech on particular topics.66
The point of highlighting this disagreement in Hill is to emphasize 
the availability of arguments to a party interested in challenging state 
termination of wireless communication and the unsteadiness of the 
Court’s approach to actions that are content-neutral on their face and 
content-based in their purpose.  The Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence leaves open the door for holding that such a regulation, 
under circumstances similar to what occurred in San Francisco, would 
be treated as content-based because of its purpose and thus subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
 
Under strict scrutiny, an action or statute can only be held 
constitutionally valid if a compelling government interest is addressed 
through the most narrowly tailored means, in which no alternative 
means are less restrictive.67  First, a court must identify a compelling 
government interest.  In the BART case, two possible government 
interests are clear: public safety and regular provision of 
transportation services.  Public safety has not been held by the 
Supreme Court to be a compelling government interest in a speech 
case, although it has in other contexts 68
Second, the government action must be the most narrowly 
tailored, and thus least restrictive, means of achieving the compelling 
government interest.  Cutting off wireless communications where 
public safety is the purported compelling government interest may 
likely not be the least restrictive means of achieving that interest 
particularly because such an action impinges on the constitutional 
right of free speech.  BART itself showed it had other better options, 
 that may reasonably be 
applied here and in other protest scenarios that have the potential to 
become dangerous.  As for the second possible state interest, the 
Court has never addressed whether providing regular, uninterrupted 
transit services is a compelling government interest.  However, it may 
be a stretch to call such an interest “compelling.”  The government 
would have an easier time arguing it is compelling if it involved 
longer-term access to public transportation or a more urgent need to 
move commuters through the system beyond the needs of a regular 
weekday rush hour. 
66. Id. at 767 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
67. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 813.
68. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 740 (1987).
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such as closing stations as it did later in August of 2011,69 thereby 
reducing the possibility of dangerous clashes among protestors, 
commuters, and police without precluding speech.  In other protests, 
such as the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, police have taken 
different measures to quell public safety hazards, such as dispersing 
people camping in public areas. 70
2. Even if Such a Regulation is Deemed to be Content-Neutral, it may still be
Unjustified Under the Constitution.
  But where a protest becomes 
particularly large and deadly, as in Egypt, the bigger issue is more 
likely whether the government’s interest is in fact public safety or the 
censorship of political speech.  BART did not show its means were 
the most narrowly tailored to achieve its ends, regardless of whether 
those ends were “compelling.”  Future constitutional challenges to 
the termination of wireless communications services will likely fail 
strict scrutiny. 
The Court’s test on the constitutionality of a content-neutral
restriction is the “time, place, and manner” doctrine.  A content-
neutral restriction on First Amendment activities is permissible if it is 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and 
leaves open ample alternative means of communication.71  In a protest 
scenario, the government could convincingly argue, as under strict 
scrutiny review, that its interest was public safety.  (Again, BART’s 
interest possibly had more to do with providing regular, 
uninterrupted service.  The Court has not reviewed whether such an 
interest is “significant” although it would be more likely to do so than 
to find it to be “compelling” under strict scrutiny.72
69. Lisa Pickoff-White, BART Shuts Down Stations After Second Anonymous
Protest, News Fix, KQED NEWS, (Aug. 22, 2011), 
http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2011/08/22/bart-braces-for-another-anonymous-protest/. 
)  Public safety, the 
most likely government interest to be alleged for interrupting wireless 
70. E.g., James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park After Protesters are
Evicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-
begin-clearing-zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html and Demian Bulwa, Oakland Orders 
Occupy Protesters to Leave Plaza, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Oct. 21, 2011), 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/10/20/BATM1LKJ24.DTL. Occupy 
was not without its own controversies, perhaps most notably the use of pepper spray 
against student protestors at University of California at Davis. Brian Stelter, U.C. Davis 
Calls for Investigation After Pepper Spraying, THE LEDE, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/19/video-of-police-pepper-spraying-u-c-davis-
students-provokes-outrage/. 
71. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796, 802.
72. See supra III.A.i.
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communication during a protest, does fall under the category of 
significant government interests.73
The question remains whether the government’s termination of 
wireless infrastructure is a narrowly tailored reaction.  When a 
government regulation is content-neutral, it is considered to be 
narrowly tailored if its ends would be achieved less effectively absent 
the regulation.  It remains unclear whether BART’s termination of 
cell phone service actually was effective and had an impact on public 
safety.  After all, people could still wirelessly communicate protest 
plans to each other outside of the underground stations.  In truth, 
they later congregated above ground, potentially creating public 
safety hazards there, when the stations themselves were shut down.
 
74
Furthermore, while such a regulation may appear narrowly 
tailored in “time” and “place,” it may not have been in terms of 
“manner” and would thus fail the applicable test.  The BART 
shutdown took place in a discrete and geographical space for a period 
of a few hours,
 
75 satisfying the “time” and “place” prongs.  But when 
reviewing “manner,” one should consider that BART shut down all 
cell phone communication, not only the messages it found dangerous 
or offensive.  While it is not common to do so, particularly in the 
United States, a cell phone service provider may have the technology 
to censor the content of text messages.76
Although Egypt may not have left open alternative means of 
communication when it shut down mobile phone connections and the 
Internet, there is room for debate as to whether BART did so.  
Because of the shutdown’s limited geographical reach, a commuter 
wanting to use his cell phone could likely just leave the station, go 
above ground, and make his call.  But an emergency could arise that 
prevents him from being able to do so, perhaps the need to stay by 
someone having a heart attack or a blockage of the exits by the 
 
73. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
74. Pickoff-White, supra note 68.
75. Cabanatuan, supra note 8.
76. See e.g., Reza Sayah, Pakistan Bans ‘Obscene’ Words from Text Messages, CNN
(Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/19/world/asia/pakistan-banned-
words/index.html; Chris Matyszczyk, How Google’s Nexus One Censors Cuss Words, 
CNET (Jan. 23, 2010) http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-10440115-71.html. But such a 
regulation would be content-based and subject to strict scrutiny, upon which the 
regulation would fail. See supra III.A.i. It may be conceded, however, that selecting 
certain words to censor still would not achieve the government’s aims. For example, 
censoring all messages that say “BART,” “4:30,” and “protest” may block out some 
innocent messages (“There’s a protest at the BART station at 4:30 so I’ll be late”) and not 
other objectionable messages (“Let’s riot at the Civic Center station in half an hour”). 
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protestors. 77   Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine that the 
government may shut down wireless services in a larger geographic 
area in the future.  What alternative means of communication would 
be left? Pay phones are disappearing, as is the use of land line phones, 
as more and more people rely on their cell phones as their only means 
of telephonic communication.78
Content-neutral regulations also must be shown not to suppress 
too much speech by foreclosing an entire medium of expression.  The 
Court stated in City of Ladue v. Gilleo: “The First Amendment 
prohibits not only content-based restrictions that censor particular 
points of view, but also content-neutral restrictions that unduly 
constrict the opportunities for free expression.”
  If the government also shuts down 
the means with which to access the Internet, the action would not 
have left open ample alternative means of communication and would 
fail the time-place-manner test. 
79  In that case, a city 
ordinance that generally prohibited display of signs on residential 
private property was struck down even though it was assumed to be 
content-neutral and viewpoint-neutral.80  “[The city of] Ladue has 
almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication 
that is both unique and important.  It has totally foreclosed that 
medium to political, religious, or personal messages.”81  The Court 
also noted that residential signs play an important part in political 
campaigns. 82   So, too, could this analysis be applied to wireless 
communication, which is being made entirely unavailable in the 
protest situation posited here. 83   In Ladue, the Court indicated 
particular concern for the medium of residential signs to be available 
for political discourse.84
77. The F.C.C. estimates 70 percent of 911 calls are made from wireless phones.
Wireless 911 Services, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 
http://www.fcc.gov/guides/wireless-911-services (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
  The constitutional right to gather people in 
order to express political opinions would be severely curtailed by a 
78. Brad Tuttle, In the Future: No More . . . Well, No More Lots of Things,
MONEYLAND, TIME, (Jan. 5, 2010), http://moneyland.time.com/2010/01/05/in-the-future-
no-more-%E2%80%A6-well-no-more-lots-of-things/. 
79. 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (citing Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 46, 57-58 (1987)). 
80. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 43.
81. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 55.
83. Even though BART’s action was temporary and the city of Ladue’s was not,
BART may not pass the “time, place, and manner” test due to its failure of the “manner” 
prong. 
84. Ladue, 512 U.S. at 54-55.
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blanket termination of wireless services.  A foreclosure of the use of 
those forms of communications would likely mean a foreclosure of 
real-time communication and the chilling of political speech.  Thus, 
even a content-neutral regulation may be constitutionally invalid in 
this context. 
B. Public Forum Analysis
Whether an area is determined to be a public forum and, if so,
what type of public forum, affects the constitutional standard of 
review.85  However, it is unclear how public forum analysis may be 
applied here.  First, a court would have to consider what the public 
forum in question is.  In the case of BART, was it the train station or 
the coverage of cell phone services? Is it the physical space where 
wireless communication services are provided or is it a virtual space 
created by a facilitator such as BART? It is hardly a trivial matter 
considering that airport terminals were held to be a nonpublic forum 
in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee.86  The 
Krishna Court’s reasoning fits soundly with a local rail station such as 
BART since it determined that “neither by tradition nor purpose can 
the terminals be described as public fora.”87  The Port Authority in 
Krishna was thus permitted by the Court to restrict expressive 
activity, which included solicitation for money.  Consider the oft-
repeated request to turn off cell phones during flight: analyzing the 
public forum as the geographic location protects the government, 
acting through the Federal Aviation Administration, when it 
disallows cell phone use on airplanes.  Like the airport terminal in 
Krishna, airplanes and the regional rail station would not likely 
receive protection as public forums considering tradition and their 
primary purpose of transporting people.88
A more likely future scenario is a protest at a public outdoor 
location, such as city parks, which were used across the country 
during the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations,
 
89
85. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
 or city streets.  In 
that case, the physical location in question would certainly be a 
86. 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992).
87. Id. at 672.
88. In fact, many BART commuters expressed extreme displeasure at being so
inconvenienced by the 2011 protests. C.W. Nevius, BART Protests: Patrons, Police Losing 
Patience, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, (Aug. 25, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2011/08/24/BAB91KRBA5.DTL. See generally the User Comments, 
id. 
89. OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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traditional public forum.  “Wherever the title of streets and parks 
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public, and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.” 90  Although the Court has identified limits to 
speech in those areas,91 public parks and streets receive the highest 
protection from government attempts to chill free speech.92
But does that mean that a protestor needs to choose a street or 
park for wireless services to be protected under the First 
Amendment? Not necessarily, for the public forum at issue may be 
the wireless service area, which was affirmatively created by BART 
working with private contractors.
 
93  As a threshold matter, one needs 
to consider whether the public forum analysis would even apply to an 
area defined by wireless communications service.  This doctrine was 
rejected in a case considering leased television access channels, given 
the dynamism of the medium,94 and the Court repeated the limit of 
the doctrine with regards to the Internet.95 “[W]e would hesitate to 
import ‘the public forum doctrine . . . wholesale into’ the context of 
the Internet.  We are wary of the notion that a partial analogy in one 
context, for which we have developed doctrines, can compel a full 
range of decisions in such a new and changing area.”96
90. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
  Presumably, 
the Court would be just as reluctant to apply public forum analysis to 
a cell phone service area. 
91. “In these quintessential public forums, the government may not prohibit all
communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show 
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly 
drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce regulations of the time, place, and 
manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
92. Id.
 93. Wireless Connections, BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT, 
http://www.bart.gov/guide/wireless.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). However, where the 
government has not acted affirmatively to provide a forum for speech, public forum 
analysis does not apply. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054, 1342 (2d 
ed. 2005) (“[T]here generally is no right to use private property for speech purposes . . . 
there is no state action, and the Constitution does not apply.”). If the government acts to 
terminate a private provider’s wireless service, the doctrines of content neutrality, 
overbreadth, and prior restraint will be appropriate instead. 
94. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 729
(1996). 
95. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205-07 (2003).
96. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 207 n.3 (citing Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 749).
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If the Court were to undertake the public forum analysis with 
regards to a wireless service area, it would be left to consider whether 
it is a designated public forum or a non-public forum since the 
traditional public forum applies only to public locations such as 
streets and parks.  A non-public forum would receive a lower level of 
scrutiny requiring only that it be reasonable and not discriminatory as 
to viewpoint, 97 but it is unlikely to be a factor in the scenarios 
hypothesized here given that wireless communications services are 
provided by government agencies for the purpose of facilitating 
speech.  What is more likely is that the communications area would 
be considered a designated public forum because the government 
made its property available for the purpose of allowing the free 
exchange of speech.98  In the case of BART, the state agency was not 
required to provide wireless service but chose to presumably for the 
convenience of customers who wanted to be able to use their cell 
phones to communicate with others.  As such, BART’s wireless 
coverage could be considered a designated public forum.  Whether a 
designated public forum is of a limited or unlimited character, 
“[r]egulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as 
that governing a traditional public forum.”99  That is to say, any 
government efforts to regulate speech in such an area on the basis of 
content would be subject to strict scrutiny.  But the Court would have 
to be willing to extrapolate “property” in the context of the public 
forum in Perry Education Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.100 to 
include the virtual space of a wireless service area, perhaps by 
flouting its reluctance to do so in United States v. American Library 
Ass’n. Inc.101
In summary, what is most important to determine under the 
public forum doctrine is which potential public forum is at issue.  A 
traditional public forum such as a public park or street would receive 
the highest First Amendment protection, as strict scrutiny must be 
applied to any government regulation on speech.  An area in which 
the government has provided, or facilitated in providing, Internet or 
wireless phone access may either be a designated public forum, also 
subject to strict scrutiny, or may not even be a public forum for the 
purposes of this analysis.  In the latter case, First Amendment 
 
97. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
98. Id. at 37.
99. Krishna, 505 U.S. at 678.
100. 460 U.S. at 37.
101. 539 U.S. at 205-07.
   
244 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [35:1 
protection may come instead from a finding of the action being 
content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny. 
C. Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates government action that
substantially inhibits more speech than is necessary to punish 
unprotected speech, according to the Court’s holding in Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma.102  Even assuming that it is proper for the government to 
stop protestors from using their phones to gather, one must consider 
how much innocuous and constitutionally protected speech103 is being 
chilled when the government terminates wireless communication in 
an area.  A court could find that too many innocuous messages were 
blocked through the manner in which BART interrupted wireless 
communication.  Consider also Egypt, which ended up restricting a 
disproportionate number of apolitical individuals, including the 
business community, in its efforts to quell protests.104
Relevant cases have hinged on what kind of speech was banned.  
The Court most recently identified an instance of overbreadth, 
consistent with Broadrick, in 2010 in the case of United States v. 
Stevens.
 
105  In that case, a federal ban on the creation, sale, and 
possession of videos of animal cruelty was found to be overbroad, 
covering too many areas of protected speech, particularly because the 
States disagree as to what constitutes animal cruelty.106  Contrast Bd. 
of Airport Comissioners of City of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 
where a ban on all “First Amendment activities” at an airport was 
determined to be overbroad.107  The Respondents in that case had 
been stopped from distributing religious literature, but the Court 
found the regulation even “prohibit[ed] talking and reading, or the 
wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing.”108
In the case of BART, the termination of certain technological   
services—rather than an inelegantly worded statute, as in Stevens and 
 
102. 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
103. See generally, Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves, THE NEW ATLANTIS,
(Summer 2004), http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/our-cell-phones-ourselves 
(describing common cell phone use as including making appointments, locating a friend, 
checking voicemail messages, or checking in at work). 
104. Alexandra Dunn, Unplugging A Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s
January 25 Uprising, 35-SUM FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 15 (2011). 
105. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
106. Id. at 1588-91.
107. 482 U.S. 569, 569 (1987).
108. Id. at 575.
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Jews for Jesus—makes it clear what speech is being foreclosed: speech 
that takes place on a cell phone.  The Court, which balked at the 
restriction of talking and reading at an airport in Jews for Jesus109 and 
of hunting videos in Stevens,110 should take as much issue with the 
prevention of the type of speech that so often occurs through cell 
phone communication.  A summary of an average person’s cell phone 
use, including live conversations, voicemail, and text messages, is 
likely to include such communication as, “Let’s go to the 8 p.m. 
movie;” “I want to sell 100 shares of GloboStock;” and “Don’t you 
think Mom is being  unreasonable?”—all constitutionally protected 
speech.  Cell phones are used for social gaming as well,111 but even the 
content of video games was found to be protected by the First 
Amendment in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n..112
The Court faced a similar question in considering two acts 
intended to prevent children’s exposure to obscenities online, where 
one was found to be overbroad and invalidated and the other was 
upheld.  In Reno, the Court reviewed portions of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, finding them to be 
overbroad as well as content-based and not sufficiently narrowly 
tailored in a 7-2 decision.
  While 
any government agency that shuts down cell phone or Internet service 
may claim a legitimate reason for doing so, it will no doubt face an 
overbreadth problem by prohibiting a substantial amount of harmless 
speech. 
113  The CDA, which criminally prohibited 
the knowing transmission, by means of a telecommunications device, 
of “obscene or indecent” material and the knowing use of an 
interactive computer service to send that material to a minor, lacked 
the precision required by the First Amendment.114  “In order to deny 
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively 
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional 
right to receive and to address to one another.”115
109. Id.
  Its breadth was 
wholly unprecedented, encompassing nonprofits and individuals 
posting indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers 
110. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
111. See e.g., Maria Sciullo, Words with Friends Soars in Popularity, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Sep. 26, 2011, http://www.suntimes.com/lifestyles/7806663-423/words-with-friends-
soars-in-popularity.html 
112. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2731 (2011).
113. Reno, 521 U.S. at 848, 864, 868, 882.
114. Id. at 844, 874.
115. Id. at 874.
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in the presence of minors.116  The CDA’s use of the terms “indecent” 
and “patently offensive” were undefined and “cover[ed] large 
amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or 
other value.”117  The Court, citing the District Court’s decision below, 
also noted that there was no practical way—given existing 
technology—to deny minors access to certain communication without 
also denying access to adults.118
However, an act targeting the same behavior was upheld in 2002 
by the Court.  In Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, the 
Court, voting 5-4, declined to find that the Child Online Protection 
Act (COPA) was overbroad.
 
119  COPA was distinguished from the 
CDA for applying to significantly less material than did the CDA by 
defining the offensive material more narrowly.120  In particular, the 
Court decided that COPA’s reliance on “contemporary community 
standards” for determining what material is harmful to minors was 
not overbroad.121  But while it alluded to the technological difficulties 
in limiting the availability of Internet material to a geographic area,122 
the majority did not address a fatal point it identified in Reno, that 
denying minors access to some material would mean denying adults 
the same access.123  Instead, Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 
found the technological limitations relevant in that different 
geographic areas may have different community standards.124
Although members of the Court penned five different opinions in 
Ashcroft, only Justice Stevens, in his dissent, referred specifically to 
the problem of overbreadth where the Internet has technological 
limitations in restricting access based on the age of the user: 
 
COPA seeks to limit protected speech that is not targeted at 
children, simply because it can be obtained by them while 
surfing the Web.  In evaluating the overbreadth of such a 
statute, we should be mindful of Justice Frankfurter’s 
admonition not to ‘burn the house to roast the pig.’ COPA 
116. Id. at 877.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 876.
119. 535 U.S. 564, 584-85 (2002). However, the majority upheld the district court’s
preliminary injunction on other grounds. Id. at 565. 
120. Id. at 578.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 575.
123. Id. at 568.
124. Id. at 577.
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not only restricts speech that is made available to the general 
public, it also covers a medium in which speech cannot be 
segregated to avoid communities where it is likely to be 
considered harmful to minors.  The Internet presents a unique 
forum for communication because information, once posted, 
is accessible everywhere on the network at once. . . . Even the 
narrowest version of the statute abridges a substantial amount 
of protected speech that many communities would not find 
harmful to minors. Because Web speakers cannot limit access 
to those specific communities, the statute is substantially 
overbroad . . . [T]he audience cannot self-segregate. As a 
result, in the context of the Internet this shield also becomes a 
sword, because the community that wishes to live without 
certain material rids not only itself, but the entire Internet of 
the offending speech.125
Stevens’s acknowledgement of the inability of users to self-
segregate may be the key to deciding, as the Court did in Reno, that a 
statute restricting Internet access for minors is overbroad because of 
its effect on adults.  In the BART example, the same analysis could 
be applied in deciding that the technological limitations in blocking 
certain content to certain people will mean that a regulation blocking 
all messages to everyone will be overbroad. 
 
One might find a window of flexibility, however, in the Broadrick 
requirement that only a regulation that prohibits substantially more 
speech than is necessary is overbroad.  A question exists if it was truly 
necessary for BART to terminate cell phone service during an 
expected time of protest.  Although the protest with which BART 
was concerned moved above ground, 126  it is impossible to know 
whether allowing cell phone communication would have resulted in a 
situation underground that would have compromised public safety. 
However, it is not difficult to imagine a dire scenario that might 
justify interrupting wireless communication.  For example, cell 
phones have been used in combat to trigger explosives.127
125. Id. at  604-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
  If the 
government received a credible tip that a bomb had been planted at 
Civic Center Plaza in San Francisco and would be detonated via 
126. Pickoff-White, supra note 68.
127. Cargo Plane Bomb Plot: Explosive Fears Could Spell End of In-Flight Wi-Fi, THE 
TELEGRAPH, (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/mobile-
phones/8108185/Cargo-plane-bomb-plot-Explosive-fears-could-spell-end-of-in-flight-Wi-
Fi.html. 
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wireless communication at a given time on a given day, certainly 
many people would agree with the constitutionality of a government 
action to shut off wireless services in the area where the bomb was 
thought to be located.128
D. Prior Restraint
  While the government regulation would 
likely have an impact on a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected speech, it could be justified as “necessary” under Broadrick 
considering the technological limitations of segregating wireless 
speech and the graveness of the government interest.  Short of such 
circumstances, terminating wireless services in a geographic area 
should be considered overbroad and thus unconstitutional. 
The doctrine of prior restraint is usually applied to government
actions such as injunctions or requiring licenses to create speech.129 
Although the government action to terminate wireless 
communication services is neither, it still constitutes a state action 
that prevents speech from occurring.  Such actions are deemed to be 
constitutionally invalid as in the canonical case of Near v. State of 
Minnesota ex rel. Olson.130  In that case, the Court held a statute that 
targeted the distribution of malicious or scandalous material prior to 
publication constituted the “essence of censorship.”131  However, it 
acknowledged limited circumstances in which such prior restraint on 
speech would be permitted, including national security concerns and 
preventing obscenity.132 The Court provided the paradigm example: 
“No one would question but that a government might prevent actual 
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing 
dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”133
The Court further clarified its position in New York Times Co. v. 
United States, 
 
134 relying on Near but also allowing the government to 
meet a “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of 
such a restraint.”135
128. The FCC envisions such a scenario. Commission Seeks Comment, supra note 15.
 In that case, the Court found the government had 
not met its burden in enjoining the publication of the Pentagon 
129. See Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) and City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
130. 283 U.S. at 713.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 716.
133. Id.
134. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
135. Id. at 714 (citing Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
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Papers.136
In a previous situation where neither an injunction nor a license 
to speak was involved, the Court declined to find a prior restraint.
  This threshold fits appropriately with the BART situation 
and the hypothetical scenario where the government expects a bomb 
to be triggered by a wireless device.  Under New York Times, it would 
be more challenging for the government to justify its restraint on 
speech in the case of BART as it would in the hypothetical bomb 
scenario, as it should be—the greater the government interest, the 
more likely it could justify a prior restraint on speech. 
137
However, the holding in Hill, which involved a speech-free buffer 
zone around an abortion clinic, was premised on several factors that 
aren’t present here.  The Hill Court found relevant, for example, that 
no channel of communication was foreclosed by the regulation and 
that the restriction only applies if the hearer doesn’t consent to being 
approached.138   The case of BART is contrasted with a foreclosure of 
an entire medium and the fact that the recipients of potential cell 
phone communication by BART users would have likely welcomed 
the communication.  Nonetheless, the Hill Court also found that the 
prior restraint doctrine applies to restrictions imposed by official 
censorship.139
Thus, the restricted application of the prior restraint doctrine in 
Hill conflicts with the principles behind Near and New York Times.  
Consider the fear that troop movements will be shared with the 
wrong party.  Would it matter, under the prior restraint doctrine, if 
the troop movements were published in a newspaper, or if someone 
shouted them out loud to an unwilling listener outside an abortion 
clinic? The Court is surely more concerned about the content of 
speech, when it involves national security, than the means in which 
such sensitive speech is restrained.  A focus on the substance of this 
doctrine, rather than its form, results in the conclusion that a 
termination of wireless services could be considered a prior restraint 
on speech and invalid when the government has failed to meet its 
heavy burden in justifying it. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION
When BART terminated cell phone and wireless services to 
silence a protest on Aug. 11, 2011, it added fuel to the fire.  The 
136. Id.
137. Hill, 530 U.S. at 734-35.
138. Id. at 734.
139. Id.
   
250 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [35:1 
protestors were now not only angry about the incident that provoked 
the protest in the first place, a fatal shooting of a knife-wielding man 
by a BART police officer, but also about what appeared to be an 
infringement of their First Amendment rights.  BART’s decision to 
terminate wireless services caused alarm as well because of the 
similarities to what autocratic regimes have done across the world to 
quell protest. 
But the United States, unlike Mubarak’s Egypt and modern 
China, values the rights of people to have opinions, particularly 
regarding politics and government action, and to share them with the 
public.  This should not change even when new forms of 
communication, such as cell phone and other wireless services, are 
made available by the government. 
The importance of safeguarding speech that takes place over 
wireless communications devices is not only based in principle but in 
the constitutional doctrines of the First Amendment. BART’s actions 
would likely be held invalid under the doctrines of content neutrality, 
public forum analysis, overbreadth, and prior restraint.  Any future 
government action that disables the public’s access to wireless 
communications should also be considered suspect. 
